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ABSTRACT
WHERE DO YOU LOOK? RELATING VISUAL ATTENTION TO
LEARNING OUTCOMES AND URL PARSING
by
Niveta Ramkumar
University of New Hampshire, May 2021
Visual behavior provides a dynamic trail of where attention is directed. It is considered the
behavioral interface between engagement and gaining information, and researchers have used it
for several decades to study user’s behavior. This thesis focuses on employing visual attention to
understand user’s behavior in two contexts: 3D learning and gauging URL safety. Such under-
standing is valuable for improving interactive tools and interface designs. In the first chapter, we
present results from studying learners’ visual behavior while engaging with tangible and virtual
3D representations of objects. This is a replication of a recent study, and we extended it using
eye tracking. By analyzing the visual behavior, we confirmed the original study results and added
more quantitative explanations for the corresponding learning outcomes. Among other things, our
results indicated that the users allocate similar visual attention while analyzing virtual and tangible
learning material. In the next chapter, we present a user study’s outcomes wherein participants are
xi
instructed to classify a set of URLs wearing an eye tracker. Much effort is spent on teaching users
how to detect malicious URLs. There has been significantly less focus on understanding exactly
how and why users routinely fail to vet URLs properly. This user study aims to fill the void by
shedding light on the underlying processes that users employ to gauge the UR L’s trustworthiness
at the time of scanning. Our findings suggest that users have a cap on the amount of cognitive
resources they are willing to expend on vetting a URL. Also, they tend to believe that the presence
of "www" in the domain name indicates that the URL is safe.
xii
CHAPTER 1
VISUAL BEHAVIOR WHILE LEARNING WITH VIRTUAL AND
TANGIBLE 3D ARTIFACTS
This chapter is based on the publication [P1] presented in the proceedings of the 8th ACM
International Symposium on Pervasive Displays (PerDis’19).
1.1 Introduction
Object-oriented learning focuses learner’s interaction with physical artifacts as the center of the
learning process [23]. It is predominantly used in the disciplines like anthropology, medicine, and
archaeology [64]. Recent advancements in technologies like 3D printing, augmented and virtual
reality has paved the way for a new realm in object-oriented learning. These technologies allow
educators to replicate artifacts eliminating the need for the use of the original artifact. However,
such technologies’ availability is not enough for fostering object-based learning as we lack the
understanding of how these new digital and tactile objects affect the learning process [24]. Pollalis
et al. conducted a study recently that sheds light on the learning outcomes when interacting with
archaeological artifacts created with three different technology; augmented reality, virtual reality,
and 3D fabrication technology. They found that the medium of representation of the object affected
the learning outcomes [53]. We replicated and extended their study by adding eye-trackers to
provide a more quantitative explanation for these observed differences in the learning outcomes.
Visual attention is considered a window into one’s mind [63, 34], and researchers have used
eye-trackers for over a decade to get insights into the learning process [37]. By adding eye-trackers
to Pollalis et al.’s study, we seek to comprehend how visual attention differs among the three
conditions and how these different visual behavior translate to learning outcomes. These insights,
in turn, will help us to design and better interactive learning tools.
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Figure 1.1. Three different representation of the same scanned museum artifact. a) 3D printed
replica, b) model displayed on a screen - sketchfab c) holographic replica - HoloLens
1.2 Overview of Related Research
Object-based learning facilitates interaction with an object to enhance the learner’s observational,
interpretation, and critical analyzing skills [32]. Also, it is found to be complementing and effec-
tual when paired with regular lectures [23]. Augmented reality is an immersive technology that
intends to blend computer-generated information into our physical world in real-time to assist us
with additional information. Prior research indicates that AR has a positive effect on the learning
process [5, 15]. Here in our study, we used HoloLens, an Optical See-Through (OST) head mount
AR device designed by Microsoft. On the other side of the spectrum, we used 3D printed objects
that provide intuitive interactions and tactile feedback. Also, it is proven to help learners to form
concrete visualization [16].
Pollalis et al. conducted a between-subject experiment to understand the learning outcomes
when users engage with three different representations of scanned museum artifacts - tangible
3D printed artifacts, 3D virtual digital models presented on a screen, and holographic artifacts
presented on the HoloLens [54]. Figure 1.1 shows the same artifact represented in the above-
mentioned forms. They evaluated the user’s learning experience in terms of enjoyment, perceived
task workload, spatial presence, and learning outcomes. Their results indicated that the 3D printed
replicas lacked visual information and did not promote the user’s conceptualization and critical
2
Figure 1.2. a) Pupil Lab’s eye tracker. b) HoloLens with eye-tracker mounted on it
thinking. At the same time, the learning goals accomplished by the other two technologies were
comparable. However, further studies are needed to understand how these technologies impact
object-based learning processes. Moreover, the roles of the physicals and digital elements of the
learning experience remain to be mapped out [4].
Extensive research has been conducted using eye-trackers to deconstruct complex tasks like
reading and learning [36, 62, 72, 10, 61, 28, 29]. In this study, we replicated the original experiment
by Pollalis et al. [54], while adding eye tracking to each condition. Our goal is to understand users’
visual behavior while interact with these object and relate it to the learning outcomes reported in
the original study. Most of prior research relating learning and visual behavior uses 2D study
material [23, 39, 41, 51, 76]. This is one of the first attempts to use visual behavior in a 3D
learning environment.
1.3 Method
1.3.1 Tasks and Procedure
Pollalis et al. developed this experiment based on a task that an archaeology student might
encounter in the class. The aim of this task is to practice the learner’s critical analysis and observa-
tional skills. The task is to select two artifacts from an available inventory of six artifacts, explore
them, and answer a corresponding artifact questionnaire. We conducted a between-subjects exper-
iment. Three groups of participants completed the same learning task by interacting with artifacts
3
Figure 1.3. Participants performing the task wearing eye trackers a) 3D prints condition, b) sketch-
fab condition c) HoloLens condition
presented along the real-virtual continuum. Thus, one group used 3D printed replicas, another used
3D virtual replicas on the Sketchfab platform [52], and another used holographic objects through
a Microsoft HoloLens application [53].
All three conditions used the same six archaeological artifacts replicated using the scans pro-
vided by the British Museum.. The inventory of artifacts, their order in the inventory, their descrip-
tions, and the eye tracking method were consistent throughout all three conditions.
3D Artifacts: These are the same objects used in the original study. It is printed using the
MakerBot Replicator 2X and Afinia H800, which are accessible in several educational spaces.
Participants wore eye-tracker while interacting with the artifacts. Printed descriptions containing
the description of the artifact were kept next to the artifact as shown in Figure 1.1.
Sketchfab: In the second condition, we used an online 3D modeling platform on the desktop.
Users could choose any artifact from the inventory and manipulate them using a mouse. Also, they
could read the description of the artifact by scrolling down the page.
HoloMuse: For the third condition, participants used HoloMuse, an AR application designed
and used by Pollalis et al. The users had to use air gestures to pick and explore the artifact from the
inventory. Unlike other conditions, the participant did not have to wear an eye-tracker separately.
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Instead, it was already mounted on the HoloLens. Figure 1.3 - c shows a participant wearing the
HoloLens and performing the study.
We collected data from 35 participants (10 female). All the participants were given a $10 gift
card at the end of the experiment. We dismissed data from 5 participants due to a low eye tracker
confidence (<70%). Thus, we report on data from 30 participants (10 participants per condition).
All the participants signed the consent forms and completed a pre-task questionnaire regarding
prior experience with visual analysis and AR or VR. They were given a brief training about their
randomly assigned condition. Before beginning the task, we calibrated the eye-tracker using screen
marker calibration [15]. After finish examining each artifact, participants were asked to fill out an
object questionnaire. Other than these forms, they had to fill a post-task questionnaire concerning
perceived task workload and spatial presence at the end of the study.
1.3.2 Eye tracking
In eye tracking, there are two different types of devices, head mount, and remote eye tracking
device. Though remote eye tracking is less intrusive, it is not suitable for our application as the
user movement is not restricted in the given space. So, we are using the head mount eye trackers
developed by Pupil Labs. The eye tracker has three camera cameras; a world camera and two slide
eye cameras. The eye camera records the pupil movement, and the world camera captures the
information in front of the user. It uses the dark pupil detection algorithm to detect the eyes, and it
calculates users’ gaze based on their pupil movements. Then, it maps the calculated gaze onto the
video from the world camera.
1.3.3 Data analysis
We used JMP Pro 14 for the statistical analysis. We checked the data’s normality and used
ANOVA (mean comparison), t-test and Tukey test (post hoc) for normally distributed data. Kruskal-
Wallis test and the Wilcoxon test was used for non-normally distributed data. To better understand
the distribution of users’ visual attention, we defined three areas of interest (AOI); the artifact, the
5
Visual inspection Complex observation Inferences Interpretation
Shape Damage Material Aesthetic
Color Detail Size Analysis
Texture Facial Feature Weight Context
Table 1.1. Thematic codes used to analyze users’ object questionnaires categorized into more
general groups
description (where they could read more about the artifact), the manipulation (which they could use
to manipulate the artifact). Any visual target other than these three categories were considered as
“other surfaces”. Due to the intuitive tactile nature of 3D objects, we did not have a separate manip-
ulation AOI for 3D prints condition. We developed image processing algorithms using MATLAB
to identify participants’ visual targets over the AOIs. These algorithms and the statistical results is
discussed in detail in the appendix [P1]).
1.4 Measures & Results
We used the following measures to understand the visual behavior and the learning outcomes in
the study.
Time on task: We calculated the overall time spent and time spent on the three AOIs using the
timestamps of each recorded data point. This helps in assessing engagement.
Result: The total time spend on completing the task was significantly different among
the conditions [X2(2)=18.7357, p<0.0001] and post-hoc results indicated that users spent
more time in the HoloLens condition compared to the other two conditions. How ever,
there was no significant difference between in the amount of time spent on the artifact
AOI among the three conditions [X2(2)=3.3626, p=0.1861]. As there was no manipula-
tion AOI for 3D prints condition, we compared the time that participants spent looking
at manipulation in the HoloLens and Sketchfab conditions. We found that the time spent
on manipulation was significantly higher in HoloLens condition than Sketchfab condition
[Z=14.2857,p<0.0002].
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Fixations: Similar to the gaze areas of interest, the fixation targets fell into three AOIs; artifacts,
descriptions and manipulation. Fixations is maintaining gaze at a particular target for a certain
time. We extracted fixations with a minimum duration 100 ms [30, 38, 52] and 1°of dispersion
angle [45]. We explored fixation in-terms of fixation rate (fixation count per minute) and overall
fixation duration.
Result: The overall fixation rate for the task was not significantly different among the
conditions [X2(2)=1.3871, p=0.4998].The fixation rate on the artifact was significantly
different and post hoc analysis indicated that fixation rate for the HoloLens condition is
lower than the other two conditions [X2(2)=10.8891, p=0.0043]. In terms of fixation rate
on the descriptions, 3D condition has higher fixation rate than the other two conditions
[X2(2)=19.4813, p<0.0001]. Since there was no manipulation AOI for the 3D prints con-
dition, we compared the results between the other two condition. With respect to manipu-
lation, HoloLens condition had a significantly higher fixation rate [Z =8.9195, p=0.0028]
and fixation duration [Z=5.4896, p=<0.0006]. Also, we did not find any significant dif-
ference in the fixation duration on artifact [X2(2)=2.2405, p=0.3262] or description AOI
[X2(2)=14.6945, p=0.0191].
Learning outcomes: Participants wrote down a down detailed explanations of the viewed artifacts
in the object questionnaire. Content codes were used to demonstrate progress from observation
to analysis, and to develop a preliminary review of learning outcomes.To analyze the open-ended
questions, we used the same coding-scheme and process as the original study. Table- 1.1 shows
the coding scheme used to analyse the open-ended questions. We acted as coders identifying
the content codes in the questionnaire responses. Our inter-code reliability >95% and resolved
disagreements by consensus.
Result: We evaluated the learning outcomes in-terms of total number of content codes and
the frequency of mentioning individual code. There was no significant difference in the
total number of content codes mentioned in the responses between the conditions [F (2,27)
= 1.552, p= 0.8570]. When analyzing the frequency of individual content code, we found
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that facial feature and detail showed significant difference. Facial feature content code was
used significantly less in the 3D condition than the other conditions. Also, Detail was also
mentioned significantly less in the HoloLens than in the 3D prints and Sketchfab condition.
Perceived task workload and spatial presence: We used the NASA TLX questionnaire [26] to
measure participants’ perceived workload. To measure participants perceived spatial presence, we
used a questionnaire based on MEC- SPQ standardized questionnaire [73]. Both these question-
naire is same as the ones used in the original study.
Result: Results suggested that the participants in the 3D prints condition experienced sig-
nificantly higher effort [F (2, 27) = 5.7838, p= 0.0081]. Also, participants also claimed to
think more intensely about the characteristics of the 3D printed artifacts [X2(2)=6.7055,
p=0.0350]. In the HoloLens condition, users felt as if the original artifact was physi-
cally present in their environment significantly more than users in the other two conditions
[X2(2)=6.3786, p=0.0412].
1.5 Discussions
In this section we combine the quantitative and qualitative results collected from the study and
discuss our main findings:
Comparison with the Original Study: In the original study, they reported on the overall time
spent on the task. By adding eye-trackers, we were able to understand how users distribute time
between examining the object, manipulating it and reading about it. Our results confirm the re-
sults of the original paper in multiple aspects. Both studies found no significant difference in the
complexity score of the open question responses about the artifact they viewed. Another common
finding was that participants of both studies confirmed the immersive nature of AR.
3D printed artifacts were the only ones to include a sense of touch and to exist physically in
the environment. Despite this participants ranked AR the highest when if they "felt as though the
original ancient artifact was physically present in [their]environment". This result suggests a new
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line of investigation, reconsidering Montessori’s finding emphasizing the role of physical material
in learning [44].
All the visual information is collected during fixation [25, 66, 70]. The rate of fixations on the
artifact was lowest for the HoloLens condition while the fixation duration was comparable among
other conditions. Both of the studies had significantly fewer mentions of facial features in the
open question responses for the HoloLens condition. It is likely that both the fewer mentions of
facial features, and the lower fixation rate are related to two innate features of the holograms: they
have lower resolution compared to the Sketchfab condition and are not tactile like the 3D prints
condition.
Physical Artifact vs. Virtual Artifact: There is not much research done in comparing visual
behavior while users engage in tasks involving similar physical and virtual objects [4, 40]. One of
the main contributions of our study is making this comparison. The fixation duration and the total
time spent on the objects is comparable among all the three conditions. Hence the visual behavior
of the virtual and tangible learning material is similar. Also, participants in Hololens condition felt
as though the original ancient artifact was physically present in environment. This shows that they
appreciate the virtual objects similar to the tangible ones.
Interface and Design Implications: Participants spent significantly higher time looking at
the manipulation AOI in the HoloLens condition. By visually inspecting the HoloLens videos,
we observed that the higher gaze time and fixation duration for manipulation in the HoloLens con-
dition was due to participant’s difficulty performing the dragging gesture. So, a possible design
improvement to the interface is to use click on a bar gesture instead of a dragging gestures to
manipulate the object.
It is shown that interaction costs can lead to increased reflection on the material [25, 47, 67, 71]
Moreover, Marshall claims that the easy manipulation of concrete objects can result in decreased
reflection on the learning material. As discussed, the HoloLens condition introduced interaction
constraint to the participants. However, the 3D printed condition users reported that they “thought
intensely about the characteristics of the ancient artifact” considerably higher than the other con-
9
ditions. This means that the manipulation effort the users made for the HoloLens condition might
have been too much, considering that the manipulation gaze time and fixation duration was highest
for this condition.
1.6 Conclusions and Future Work
By adding eye-tracking to the original study, we were able to replicate the original study results and
provide a more in-depth understanding of the observed learning outcomes. Our results indicated
the following, 1) Users’ visual behavior towards virtual learning material is similar to tangible
ones. 2) the total time spent on examining the artifact is independent of the medium of presentation
and is more dependent on the manipulation options provided in that medium. Especially in the
HoloLens condition, users spent significantly higher time on the manipulation, emphasizing the
need to explore the role of physical manipulation in learning further. Another aspect that needs
to be explored in the future is to analyze collaborative object-based learning and understand how
these new technologies aid collaborative object-oriented learning.
10
CHAPTER 2
EYES ON URLS: RELATING VISUAL BEHAVIOR TO SAFETY
DECISIONS
This chapter is based on the publication [P2], Eyes on URLs: relating visual behavior to safety
decisions. It is published in the ACM Symposium on Eye Tracking Research and Applications
(ETRA ’20 Full Papers).
2.1 Introduction
A uniform resource locator (URL) is a string of characters that specifies how and where to retrieve
a web resource. People encounter URLs everyday in various environments, such as emails, social
media, web browsers, and other applications. On every encounter, they must determine whether
these URLs are safe to click on or not. Incorrect evaluation of an URL can expose the individual
or their organization to phishing attacks. Users assess the URL based on their knowledge of URL
structure, the URL itself, their mood, the context under which the URL is presented, and other
determinants. As many factors involve in this determination, nefarious actors exploit the user’s
inability to correctly interpret the information conveyed in URLs to carry phishing attacks [65].
According to the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), there were 255,065 unique phishing
attacks in 2016, and it is increasing day by day [1]. However, there has been significant effort
spent on improving the user’s ability to vet URLs, e.g., through user training [33, 57] or adoption
of browser warnings [56, 42]. And there has also been vital research on understanding how and
why users fall for phishing attacks more generally [17, 27].
Researchers have used eye tracking for many decades to obtain a comprehensive understanding
of user behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is one of the first attempts to understand
visual attention while users assess URLs. This will help us create a descriptive model of the
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relationship between URL characteristics and visual behavior. This, in turn, will supplement our
understanding of why certain succeed and how to develop better countermeasures and training
techniques. We conducted a user study where users were asked to classify URLs as safe or unsafe
while wearing an eye tracker. We evaluated the results in terms of total time spent, fixation count,
fixation count on various areas of interest (AOIs), time spent on each AOI, pupil dilation, and
backtrack fixation count. Our key finding is that users have a cap on the amount of time they spend
on assessing a URL, and they depend more upon the authority component of URLs than any
other component.
2.2 Overview of Related Research
Eye-tracking has been used for over a century in one form or the other to understand human be-
havior. Researches have used this technology to assess cognitive load [49, 50, 55, 77], reading
strategies [10, 61, 28, 29], and design implications [22, 7]. When users make decisions about the
safety of URLs, they do so by reading. A great deal of research has been conducted to estab-
lish the relationships between reading and eye movements [69, 11, 60, 77]. The most commonly
used eye-tracking measures to describe the eye movements while reading are fixations, saccades,
regressions, and backtracks [69, 11]. Also, Just and Carpenter proposed the "eye-mind" theory,
according to which longer fixation indicates higher comprehensive load.
An interesting class of security challenges deals with ensuring that users properly interpret
and operationalize computer security information. Also, a salient challenge within this class in-
volves ensuring that users correctly vet URLs. Many phishing attacks rely on presenting malicious
URLs that look safe to unsuspecting victims. Since the early 2000s, researchers have: studied
who falls for phishing attacks and why they fall for them, e.g., [17, 68]; the effectiveness of defen-
sive measures [75, 19]; categorized different types of phishing and URL obfuscation techniques,
e.g., [18, 48]; examined specific flavors of attacks, e.g., [58]; developed explanatory models of
how phishing attacks are conducted, e.g., [31]; proposed phishing detection systems, e.g., [20];
analyzed phishing detection systems, e.g., [2]; and analyzed anti-phishing training systems [35].
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Eye-tracking has been used in usable security for training and understanding user behavior.
Miyamoto et al. developed a system using an eye tracker to train users to look at the status bar
on websites [43]. To understand how users gauge the website’s legitimacy, Alsharnouby et al.
conducted a user study that uses eye-trackers while participants classify websites as legitimate or
illegitimate [3] . While similar in spirit to these earlier studies, our focus in this paper is solely on
understanding how users process URLs. We are working at a different level of granularity; we are
not concerned with how people visually process websites but rather how people visually process
URLs. Working at this finer level of granularity enables us to dissect URLs into different parts
and examine how people process each part. We seek to understand what parts of a URL people
pay attention to, what parts they don’t, when people give up, and how their eyes process different
flavors of URLs, amongst other things.
2.2.1 URL Structure
Each URL in our corpus has the form: <scheme>://<authority><rest>. The below
table - 2.1 indicates how a URL is disaggregated into these components. Here, we discuss the
basics of the URL structure at an appropriate level of granularity to understand our work.
scheme delims. authority rest
https :// www.google.com /maps/
Table 2.1. Disaggregation of a URL into its three components.
• Scheme: This corresponds to a scheme name, which indicates how to interpret the text
following the colon [9, 8, 74].
• Authority: The authority component specifies a subset of the host, port, username,
and password [8, 74]. For URLs in our corpus, the authority component has either
the form host or user@host where host represents the host and user represents the
username.
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• Rest: It is a term we use to indicate any characters following the authority component.
It could be empty or in certain cases it may comprise of the path or queries or fragments.
2.3 Method
2.3.1 URL Corpus and Classification
Our corpus contained a total of 64 URLs that fell into 8 categories. These eight URL cate-
gories are presented in Table 2.2 and each category has 8 URLs. This corpus is primarily designed
to test the hypothesis discussed in the results section. To maintain uniformity among the cate-
gories, every URL has the same scheme component (https) and the top-level domain (com). The
categories are defined by the following 4 features: (1) safety, (2) complexity, (3) a leading www in
the authority component, and (4) the attack type for unsafe URLs.
• Safety: For safe URLs, we chose fully verified domain names priarily from the top 1,000US
websites in the Quantcast Top One Million list. While unsafe URLs contained URLs that
did not have a domain name server record, or were spoofed websites.
• Complexity: In complexity category, we grouped URLs into simple and complex. This
classification is made based on the URL length and URL features. A URL is considered
simple if it has an empty path (i.e no rest component) and complex if it has a non-empty
rest component.
• Presence of www: URLs with the www attribute begin with https://www . URLs with
the non-www attribute do not.
• Attack Type: We chose to explore four conditions for unsafe URLs: Positive, negative,
substring and user@host. These attack types does not fully representative of real-world
attacks. Our motive here was to explore a variety of conditions that may affect visual
behaviors and/or classification. Positive attack types had positive, feel good phrases in
the URL. On the other hand, negative attack type had negative or security related words
like malware, antivirus. The substring attack uses safe domain name like https://X.
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Category Safety Complexity www Attack Type URL Length
C1 safe simple www N/A 25.0 (4.8)
C2 safe simple non-www N/A 19.8 (2.0)
C3 safe complex www N/A 124.0 (13.2)
C4 safe complex non-www N/A 105.3 (13.5)
C5 unsafe simple www positive 28.5 (2.4)
C6 unsafe simple www negative 29.3 (3.6)
C7 unsafe complex non-www substring 96.0 (20.4)
C8 unsafe complex www user@host 95.0 (17.4)
Table 2.2. Categories of URL corpus.
com and obfuscate it as https://X.Y.com. In user@host attack type, authority
component has form www.X.com@Y where https://www.X.com is a legitimate URL.
2.3.2 Tasks and Procedure
We conducted a within-subject experiment with 20 participants (3 female). As a part of their
coursework requirement, students participated in our study. We discarded data from 4 participants
due to technical issues with the eye tracker. Hence, we report on the data from 16 participants (2
female).
The task is to classify the URLs shown on the screen as "Safe" or "Unsafe". Users were
shown 64 URLs individually and asked the question, "Is the web address safe to visit?. It was
accompanied by two response buttons that read "Safe" and "Unsafe". The aim is to analyze and
understand how certain URL properties influence the decision-making and the visual behavior.
Mood can affect a person’s ability to comprehend text and their judgment [21, 12].To reduce the
effect of mood in our study, which in turn improves study replicability, we used neutral mood
induction by making the participants watch a neutral video.
The URL corpus was split into two equal-sized sets presented over two sessions, such that four
URLs from each category were represented in each set. For each session, the order in which URLs
were presented was randomly determined but held fixed for all participants. However, the session
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Figure 2.1. A processed frame from the eye tracker video. The red cursor indicates gaze position
and the four colored boxes represent four AOIs: the scheme AOI(red), the authority AOI(green),
the rest AOI(blue), and the response AOI(yellow).
order alternated between participants. At the end of the session, they were asked to fill a post-task
questionnaire containing questions about demography and security knowledge.
2.3.3 Eye tracking & User Interface
To collect the gaze data, we used Dikablis eye trackers. It contains three cameras; two to record
the pupil and one to record the scene in front of the user. Calibration is an essential aspect of eye-
tracking as it establishes a mathematical relation between the eye and the target being focused. In
our study, we used a four-point operator-controlled calibration method in our study [46].
The URLs were presented to the participants in a 24" monitor over an application created using
MATLAB. Figure - 2.1 is a processed frame from the eye-tracker and it shows the GUI used in
the study. We maintained the font and size of the text constant throughout the study. Four markers
were embedded in the application to identify the surface plane to mark various AOIs during post-
processing of the eye-tracking data. Along with the gaze data and post-task questionnaire, we also
recorded response and the time of response.
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scheme AOI authority AOI rest AOI
https:// www.google.com /maps/
Table 2.3. Disaggregation of a URL in accordance with the first three AOIs. This differs from
Table 2.1 in that the scheme AOI includes the “://” following the scheme.
2.3.4 Data analysis
MATLAB software was used for post-processing all our eye-tracking and post-task question-
naire data. For statistical analysis, we used JMP Pro 14 and R. Initially, the data were tested
for normality using the Shapiro-Wilk test. Since all our data were non-normally distributed, we
Kruskal-Wallis test and Wilcoxon test for analysis.
2.4 Measures
We used the following measures to understand the visual behavior and the decision outcomes in
our study.).
Mood: Participant’s mood was assessed along six emotional state : awake, pleasant, angry, fear-
ful, happy, and sad. They ranked their current emotional state using a 10-point scale, where 10
indicated that they highly associated with their mood.
Score: Score is the total number of correctly classified URLs within a set. There was no penalty
for incorrect classification.
Total Time Spent: The total time spent on a task is a proxy for cumulative effort and engagement.
Here, the total time spent represents the time in seconds that user spend on each URL before
clicking on a button to classify it.
We used the following measures to understand and compare the visual behavior while users
complete the task.
Time Spent on Areas of Interest: We computed the percentage dwell time on five AOIs using
the timestamps from the eye-tracker. This measure is used to assess distribution of users’ visual
attention and understand which URL components users use to gauge URL safety. These five AOIs
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are discussed in detail below and Table 2.3 gives a disaggregation of a URL in accordance with the
AOIs that correspond to the URL.
• Scheme AOI: It consists of the scheme component and the delimiters following it. As all
the URLs use "https" as the scheme, the scheme AOI in our study always corresponds to
"https://" in the URL.
• Scheme AOI: It represents the authority component. For classes C1 through C7,
the authority component is a fully qualified domain name, e.g., www.google.com
is the authority component of https://www.google.com. For class C8, the
authority component has form user@host, e.g., as in www.google.com@evil.
com. To test P5, the authority AOI was further split into two smaller AOIs, the user AOI
and the host AOI corresponding to the user and host components. Indeed, the purpose
of class 8 is precisely to explore how URLs of this form may break user expectations of
what the domain name is.
• Rest AOI: It captures the rest component.
• Response AOI: The gaze targets on the response portion of the screen where the “Safe”
and “Unsafe” buttons are located comes under this AOI.
• Anything other than the above mentioned four AOIs is captured in this last AOI and is not
a part of the statistical analysis.
Fixations and Backtracking Fixations: Fixation is a cluster of gaze target indicating that the user
is looking at a particular information for a certain duration of time. It represents the time where new
information is gathered [59]. Whereas, backtracking is the process of revisiting information that
was previously processed or skipped [13]. It usually occurs to re-establish previously processed
information or it signifies a cognitive interest in an area with respect to the given task [14]. We
measured the backtrack fixation count, i.e., the number of fixations involving backtracking.
As the number of characters in each URLs differ, we normalized these measures for com-
parison. For the overall comparison, we computed overall time spent per character (total time
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spent/total URL length), overall fixation count per character (total fixation count/total URL length),
and backtrack fixation count per character(total backtrack fixations/total URL length). Similarly,
the number of characters in the scheme, authority, and rest components of the URL may
vary. Thus, for the corresponding AOIs, we calculated the time spent per character (total time
spent on AOI divided by number of characters in AOI) and the fixation count per character (total
number of fixations occurring on AOI divided by total number of characters in AOI).
2.5 Results & Discussion
The statistical results is discussed in detail in the appendix [P2]. We present here the important
hypothesis and their results.
H1: Total time spent on processing a URL is longer for complex URLs than it is for simple URLs.
The overall time spent on classifying simple(and shorter) URLs (C1, C2, C5, C6) was less
than the total time spent on classifying complex(and longer) URLs (C3, C4, C7, C8) [
Z=3.4865, p=0.0005]. This weakly supports H1, though follow-up work must be done to
disentangle length from other complexity factors.
H2: Total time spent on processing a URL, normalized by the URL length, is shorter for complex
URLs than it is for simple URLs.
For complex URLs, we found URL length negatively correlated with time spent per char-
acter and fixation count per character. This supports H2. We did not observe a correlation
between URL length and score.
H3: There exists a URL length threshold over which increasing URL length does not result in
more time being spent on processing URLs.
Results indicate that at a threshold of approximately 100 characters, time spent stops in-
creasing as we increase URL length. Similar trends were observed with fixation count per
character and backtrack fixation count per character. We also observed no statistical dif-
ference between time spent on complex URLs under 100 characters and those above. One
interpretation is captured by a notion similar to that of the compliance budget proposed by
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Beautement et al. [6]: the user may only expend a finite budget of resources (here, time is
a proxy for expended resources) to classify a URL, and, if the resources required to fully
process a URL exceeds this budget, the user will not expend them.
H4: Total time spent on the scheme per character is less than that of the authority and rest
components.
We observed a statistically significant difference in time spent per character between the
scheme AOI and the authority AOI (with the latter being higher) [X2(2)=30.4152, p<0.0001];
however, we did not observe such a difference for the scheme AOI and the rest AOI. There-
fore, we do not have evidence to support H4.
The study suggests a sort of ceiling effect: as URL length increases, participants spend less
time per character on vetting the URL until a cap on time spent is reached. It also provides visual
evidence of user misperceptions regarding URL structure. These insights into how users process
and perceive URLs suggest concrete steps and best practices for services to improve the perceived
security - and, we argue, the actual security - associated with the URLs they serve. For example,
from a purely technical standpoint, there is no intrinsic security benefit to serving a URL that is
short, has a domain name that begins with www , and does not include unnecessary special charac-
ters. But if those URLs match users’ safety expectations, users would be better at classifying both
safe URLs served by the service and unsafe, obfuscated URLs served by the adversary.
Some unsafe URLs from our corpus were classified as safe because they exploited uncommon
URL features that users rarely encounter in practice with legitimate services. Ironically, this makes
such URLs easy to classify as risky by a computer. Surprisingly, we found that some - not all - web
browsers offer no user protection against such URLs, even though simple-to-write parsers could
easily detect them. This provides an opportunity to improve security at minimal cost.
Last, our findings can improve the quality of security awareness training programs. Our study
identifies various misperceptions held by users. It also provides concrete evidence of where users
look as they process URLs. This study’s methods and data may help in assessing, comparing, and
improving training modules that aim to help users correctly identify URLs.
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2.6 Conclusions and Future Work
Eye tracking provides a window to examine security behavior. This paper is a first step toward
developing a model that captures how users visually process, derive meaning from, and opera-
tionalize URL security information to gauge URL safety. We conducted a user study in which
participants saw URLs and then classified them while wearing an eye tracker. The findings sug-
gest that participants relied on poor security indicators such as presence of www to gauge URL
legitimacy, that they spent more time and cognitive resources to vet longer URLs but only up to a
point, and that, for the unsafe, user@host URLs, participants perceived the user component to
be the host component. In future work, we plan to study other contextual factors such as mood,
additional flavors of URL obfuscation, and the effectiveness of training the user.
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In this paper, we present results from a study of users’ visual be-
havior while engaging with tangible and virtual representations
of archaeological artifacts. We replicated and extended a recent
study that introduced an augmented reality system implemented
using HoloLens, for engaging with the artifacts. Our study goes
beyond the original study to estimate the distribution of users’ vi-
sual attention for both tangible and virtual representations of the
artifacts. Our study confirmed the results of the original study in
various aspects. Specifically, participants in both studies confirmed
the immersive nature of the HoloLens condition and showed similar
learning outcomes in terms of post-task open questions. Addition-
ally, our findings indicate that users allocate their visual attention
in similar ways when interacting with virtual and tangible learning
material, in terms of total gaze duration, gaze on object duration,
and object fixation duration.
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Figure 1: Inventory of 3D artifacts and the participant ex-
ploring their chosen artifact (left). A participantwearing eye
tracker working with the Sketchfab platform (right)
1 INTRODUCTION
Object-based learning emphasizes the student’s interaction with
physical artifacts in the learning process. This pedagogical approach
has been found to be more effective than relying exclusively on
lectures[7]. This approach is well established in various fields in-
cluding archaeology, art history, and anthropology[33]. The advent
of technologies such as virtual reality (VR), augmented reality (AR),
and 3D fabrication, has created opportunities for implementing
object-based learning without the need to access the original physi-
cal artifacts[8]. These technologies allow educators to create tactile
and virtual models of the artifacts so that students can learn by
exploring and analyzing these models [30]. However, relatively
little is known about how tactile and virtual models can be used
in object-based learning. Recently, Pollalis et al.[30] conducted an
experiment to evaluate learning with three different representa-
tions of ancient artifacts. Users interacted with artifacts represented
as 3D models on a computer screen, as 3D virtual models in aug-
mented reality, and as 3D fabricated tangible objects. Pollalis et
al. found that there were differences in learning outcomes for the
three types of presentations. The study we present here replicates
core aspects of this study but extend it by asking the following two
questions. First, how does visual attention vary among the three
conditions? Second, how are differences in visual attention related
to the differences in learning outcomes?
Replicating studies in HCI is important because practitioners
and researchers could better trust and build upon results from the
studies of novel technologies that can be, and have been, replicated.
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Figure 2: Participant wearing HoloLens with the add-on eye
tracker(right). Screenshot of the hologram indicating the
three areas of interest (AOI) in the Hololens condition(left).
"Replicate and extend" studies in particular, test the limits and perti-
nence of previous results[6, 11]. In this study, we replicate the tasks
and experimental designs utilized by Pollalis et al. while extend-
ing it by collecting eye tracking data to study the visual behavior
of participants. By observing visual behaviors, we can provide a
quantitative measure of users’ interaction with the artifacts, which
can in turn help us understand the reasons for the observed learn-
ing outcomes. This understanding can then assist us in improving
existing and future interactive learning tools. Here we report the
findings form a study comparing how users interact with three
representations of objects: 3D printed replicas of museum artifacts,
holographic replicas, and 3D digital models displayed on a screen.
We used an eye tracker to follow users’ gaze movements to study
their visual behavior. Our contributions beyond replicating the re-
sults of the original study include: 1) a new study using eye tracking
to analyze users’ visual behavior while learning about 3D objects;
2) computational methods for analyzing visual behavior around
3D objects and digital 3D digital models; and 3) understanding of
users’ visual behavior and how it is related to learning outcomes in
an object-based learning activity.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Object-Based Learning
Object based learning pedagogy views the learner’s interaction
with objects as critical for the learning process. Direct interaction
with objects allows learners to take charge of their learning process
and construct meanings to enhance their critical thinking skills[15].
Much research indicates the benefits of AR for learning and problem
solving [3, 18, 27]. AR has been shown to be useful in motivating
students in the learning process. Taking advantage of the features of
this technology allows educators to improve students’ educational
experience, their engagement, and their academic achievement
[2, 3]. On the other end, evidence shows that concrete visual models,
such as 3D printed replicas, could capture students’ attention and
provide physical context in which to think about concepts. This
makes students feel more comfortable visualizing and describing
the material [4, 13].
2.1.1 The original study. Pollalis et al. conducted experiments to
understand the learning outcomes when users are engaged with
three kinds of replicas of museum artifacts: tangible 3D printed
artifacts, 3D virtual models presented on a screen, and holographic
artifacts [31]. These specific types of objects on the tangible-virtual
spectrum were chosen due to their increasing availability in higher
education[14]. The authors assessed users’ enjoyment, perceived
task workload, spatial presence, and learning outcomes. They ob-
served that object-based learning goals were accomplished com-
parably with holographic artifacts and with the digital 3D models,
while 3D replicas lacked visual information impeding learners’ con-
textualization and critical thinking.
However, further studies are needed to understand how these
technologies impact object-based learning processes. Moreover, the
roles the physicals and digital elements of the learning experience
remain to bemapped out [1]. In this study, we replicated the original
experiment by Pollalis et al. [31], while adding eye tracking to each
condition. Our goal is to build an understanding of users’ visual
behavior and how it is related to the learning outcomes reported in
the original study.
2.2 Learning and Visual Behavior
Several studies use eye movements to describe users’ visual at-
tention, as they are considered the behavioral interface between
attention and gaining information from the surrounding environ-
ment [17, 32, 40] When considering the learning process and its
outcomes, many studies use eye tracking to track how learners
interact with the learning material [28], predict their level of com-
prehension [20], and their learning efficiency [7]. Daraghmi et al.
developed an on-screen learning system using eye tracking to give
learners feedback about their learning [5]. However, the major-
ity of literature that addresses users’ visual behavior in learning
focuses on learning material that is presented on a 2D surface
[7, 21, 23, 28, 40, 42].
Van der Meulen et al. developed a method to combine eye track-
ing data with head-tracking data provided by HoloLens in order to
improve our ability to assess the gaze location of HoloLens users.
We are using this method in our study. However, the AR targets in
their study were 2D[39]. In this study, we evaluate visual behavior
of learners while learning about artifacts replicated in three dif-
ferent and increasingly available methods of creation: 3D printed
physical objects, on-screen digital 3D models, and AR visualization
of 3D holograms. To our knowledge, this is the first study using
eye tracking to analyze users’ visual behavior while learning about
3D objects with these modalities.
3 STUDY
3.1 Experimental Design and Tasks
We conducted a between-subjects experiment in which three groups
of participants completed the same learning task. The learning
task was developed by Pollalis et al. [31]. It is a task that students
might encounter in an archaeology class, and its aim is to enhance
students’ observational skills and their critical analysis skills. The
task consists of selecting two artifacts from an available inventory
of six artifacts, exploring them, and answering the corresponding
artifact questionnaire. For each object, participants were asked to
indicate the first detail they noticed, all the details they observed,
and what characteristic about the object made it unique or similar
to the other artifacts in the set. We did not impose a time limit
on the task. Participants completed the learning task either using
tangible 3D replicas, virtual 3D replicas, or holographic objects [29].
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Across the 3 conditions we used different replicas of the same 6
archaeological artifacts.
3.1.1 Tangible 3D replicas (3D prints). In the tangible 3D printed
condition, subjects could choose an artifact from a 3D printed
gallery of six objects. These objects are the same 3D printed arti-
facts used in the original study [31]. The Printed descriptions next
to the artifacts are identical to the ones in the original study (Figure
1). Participants were free to choose and explore the replicas while
wearing an eye tracker.
3.1.2 Sketchfab Condition. Participants in the second condition
used Sketchfab, an online 3D modeling platform on a desktop[29].
They could choose any of the 3D models in an inventory of six
objects, manipulate the chosen artifact using a mouse, and read
more about it in a section below it. The platform was configured
in a similar fashion to Pollalis et al. [31]. In the original study, the
description section was right next to the artifact section, so the
participant did not have to scroll down to view the descriptions.
However, in the new version of the Sketchfab which we used the
user has to scroll down the page to read the description.
3.1.3 Holographic objects (HoloMuse). The third condition con-
sisted of participants using HoloMuse [30], an AR application on
Microsoft HoloLens, which was developed and used by Pollalis et.
al[31]. It introduces subjects to an inventory of six holographic
objects. They could use air gestures to pick and handle the artifacts
by moving, scaling and rotating them (see Figure 2). Users were
also able to remove the artifact’s material to view its surface and
reveal supplementary information about the artifact.
3.1.4 Eye Tracking. Weused Pupil Labs head-mounted eye trackers
[16] to track users’ gaze during the experiment. This eye tracker
has a world camera capturing the users’ environment, and two slide
cameras for users’ pupils. It then calculates users’ gaze based on
their pupil movements and maps it onto the video from the world
camera to display the target the user is looking at. Participants who
interacted with 3D artifact and Sketchfab wore the eye tracker. In
the HoloLens condition we used an eye tracker add-on[39]. The
inventory of artifacts, their order in the inventory, their descriptions,
and the eye tracking method were consistent throughout all three
conditions.
3.2 Participants
We collected data from 35 participants (10 female, average age =
23.5, SD=3.2); 12 participants in 3D prints condition (3 female), 10
participants for Sketchfab condition (3 female), and 13 participants
for HoloLens condition (4 female). All the participants were given a
$10 gift card at the end of the experiment. We dismissed data from
2 participants in the 3D prints condition and 3 participants in the
HoloLens condition due to a low eye tracker confidence (<70%). The
low confidence resulted from a suboptimal angle of the eye tracker
with respect to the subject’s pupils. Thus, we report on data from
30 participants (10 female).
3.3 Procedure
After signing the consent forms, the participants filled out a pre-task
questionnaire stating prior practice with visual analysis (e.g. art
history class), and specifying former experience with 3D modeling
software, AR, or VR. Depending on the condition they were ran-
domly assigned to, participants were asked to wear the eye tracker
or the HoloLens, were shown an inventory of six artifacts, and
were given a brief training on how to choose an object and handle
it. Before starting the task, the worn eye tracker was calibrated
using screen marker calibration [34]. The HoloLens condition in-
cluded an additional step in which we connected the HoloLens
and its eye tracker to a server computer to synchronize time on
both devices, so that we get real time data about the user: their
position, head rotation, name of the hologram they are viewing,
and their gaze information. In order to minimize the movement of
the headset, we ensured that the HoloLens’s headband was secured
on the user’s head. HoloLens condition participants were trained
on how to use the device as well. Following the initial stage of the
study, participants were given the task of choosing and studying
two artifacts. They were asked to fill out an object questionnaire
for each chosen object using a laptop we provided. After finishing
the task, they were given a post-task questionnaire to fill. This form
consisted of 15 questions, each being a 5-point Likert-type ratings
ranging from "Strongly Disagree" to "Strongly Agree". A NASA
TLX questionnaire [10] and four open-ended questions were also
part of the post-task form. HoloLens users were also asked if they
experienced any discomfort while performing the task. Collected
data includes: questionnaire responses and eye tracking; for the
HoloLens condition we logged data from the server and recorded
videos from the HoloLens camera using its online portal.
4 DATA ANALYSIS
We used JMP Pro 14 for the statistical analysis of the results. The
collected data was initially tested for normality using Shapiro-Wilk
test. For the normally distributed data we used ANOVA for mean
comparison, t-test and Tukey test for post hoc analysis. For the
non-normally distributed data we used non-parametric Kruskal-
Wallis test and the Wilcoxon test for post-hoc analysis. To analyze
the open-ended questions, we used the same coding-scheme and
process as the original study. Our participants were free to interact
with the artifacts and manipulate them with no time limit or any
restrictions on how to study the artifact. To better understand the
distribution of users’ visual attention, we defined three areas of
interest(AOI): the artifact, the description (where they could read
more about the artifact), the manipulation (which they could use to
manipulate the artifact). Any visual target other than these three
were categorized as "other surfaces" and will focus on the main
three AOIs for statistical analysis. We developed algorithms using
MATLAB (discussed below) to identify participants’ visual targets
over the time.
4.1 3D Prints Condition
Initially the image from the world camera (see Figure 3) is con-
verted into grayscale image. The resulting image then goes through
binary conversion using thresholding, and noise removal. Every
frame goes through this two-stage processing to detect objects and
descriptions separately. Subsequently, we developed an algorithm
to mark a perimeter around each item using its centroid, as shown
by blue stars in Figure 3. In this figure, the green star represents
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Figure 3: A frame from the eye tracker’s world camera with
the artifact (white) and the description (red)(right). (b) The
same image after being processed to identify the artifact and
description AOI(left)
the gaze location of the participant at the artifact. If the gaze by
a participant was inside the box around an item, we concluded
that they were looking at that item. Otherwise, we marked that
gaze as "other surfaces" as it was not aimed at a place of interest
(artifact or description). Unlike the other two conditions, there is
no manipulation AOI for the 3D prints; participants use their hands
to directly manipulate the tactile objects. We validated the above
algorithm by visually inspecting 1000 randomly selected frames,
we found that the accuracy of the detection algorithm was greater
than 95%.
4.2 Virtual 3D replicas (Sketchfab)
Similar to the 3D condition, the video of the world camera was
analyzed frame by frame to identify the three AOI. Markers were
used to mark the boundaries of the laptop screen (see figure 4). Our
algorithm first filtered out the regions on the screen that were not
of interest (using the markers) and separated the scroll bar which
is the manipulation AOI. Then the remaining section of the screen
undergoes binary conversion and noise removal to identify the
artifact/description AOI based on their color; artifacts’ background
is black, and the description background is white (see figure 4).
4.3 HoloLens Condition
The eye tracker add-on camera could not see the holograms dis-
played by the HoloLens. Similar to Van der Meulen et al. work,
we developed an algorithm to map users’ gaze position into the
holographic environment [39]. We collected the users’ gaze infor-
mation from the eye tracker, and holographic environment details
from HoloLens. We logged information from a server that synchro-
nizes the eye tracker and the HoloLens. Then we combined this
information to find the gaze target of the participant in the aug-
mented space; the holographic artifact (with its name), description,
manipulations (move, rotate, etc.), or other surfaces.
4.4 Measures and Indicators
4.4.1 Time on Task. Using the timestamp of each data point recorded
by the eye tracker, we calculated the time spent exploring each ar-
tifact and other AOI for all participants. We used this measure to
assess meaningful engagement and determine how it is affected by
the interaction styles.
4.4.2 Fixations. We used fixations to evaluate the visual behavior
of the participants as they attended to different AOI (e.g. artifacts
and descriptions). Fixations are the state of maintaining the gaze at
Figure 4: A frame from the eye tracker’sworld camera (right)
and the same image after being processed to identify the arti-
fact and descriptions (left) The red box identifies the artifact
region and the green dot shows the user’s gaze
a target for a specific amount of time. We extracted fixations with
a minimum duration 100 ms[12, 19, 29] and 1°of dispersion angle
[25]. We modified the above-mentioned gaze algorithms to find
the fixation target. Similar to the gaze AOI, the fixation targets fell
into the categories of artifact, manipulation, description, and other
surfaces. We explored fixation in terms of fixation rate (fixation
count per minute) and duration on the above-mentioned AOI and
its overall values.
4.4.3 Learning Outcomes. Study participants were expected to
write down detailed explanations of the viewed artifacts. Content
codes were used to demonstrate progress from observation to anal-
ysis, and to develop a preliminary review of learning outcomes. We
used the codes developed by Pollalis et al.[31] since the question-
naire used in our study was the same as the one they composed.
The content code are : texture, color, detail, facial feature, damage,
material, weight, size, analysis and context. The first two authors
acted as coders identifying the content codes in the questionnaire
responses. Their inter-code reliability >95%. Disagreements were
resolved by consensus.
4.4.4 Perceived Task Workload and Spatial Presence. We used the
NASA TLX questionnaire [10][10] used in the original study to
measure participants’ perceived workload. Another series of ques-
tions used in the original study was utilized to measure participants
perceived spatial presence. These questions were roughly based on
the MEC- SPQ standardized questionnaire [41].
Figure 5: Time participants spent on the task for each condi-
tion. The white bar indicates the average time.
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5 RESULTS
5.1 Time on Task
The total time participants spent to complete the task can be found
in Figure 5. Kruskal-Wallis test indicated that there was a signifi-
cant effect of condition on total time spent on task [X 2(2)=18.7357,
p<0.0001]. The Post hoc comparison showed that the time spent
to complete the HoloLens condition task was significantly higher
than the other two conditions. This matches the results from the
original study for the time on task. Percentage of time distribution
among the AOI can be found in Figure 6. There was no signifi-
cant difference between the time spent on the artifact itself among
the three conditions [X 2(2)=3.3626, p=0.1861]. However, the time
spent on the description of the artifact differ significantly based on
the condition [X 2(2)=13.0477,p=0.0015]. Post hoc testing identified
that the time spent on the description was significantly higher in
the Sketchfab condition than in the other two conditions. There
was a significant difference in the time spent on other surfaces
[X 2(2)=19.3652,p<0.0001] and the post hoc analysis indicated sig-
nificantly higher time spent in the HoloLens condition. Given that
there was no manipulation AOI for 3D prints condition, we used the
Wilcoxon Test to compare the time that participants spent looking at
manipulation in the HoloLens and Sketchfab conditions. We found
that the time spent on manipulation was significantly higher in
HoloLens condition than Sketchfab condition [Z=14.2857,p<0.0002].
5.2 Fixations
We analyzed fixations from two perspectives; fixation duration, and
the fixation rate.
5.2.1 Fixation Rate. The fixation rate (number of fixations per
minute) for each condition can be found in Figure 7. The overall
fixation rate for the task was not significantly different among the
conditions [X 2(2)=1.3871, p=0.4998]. For distribution of fixations
among various AOI we report on 28 participants due to momentary
server failure for 2 participants in the HoloLens condition (time
mismatch). The fixation rate on the artifact was significantly dif-
ferent [X 2(2)=10.8891, p=0.0043]. Post hoc analysis indicated that
fixation rate for the HoloLens condition is lower than the other
two conditions. Also, the fixation rate on the description was sig-
nificantly different overall [X 2(2)=19.4813, p<0.0001]. The post hoc
analysis indicated that the 3D condition has higher fixation rate on
the description than the other two conditions. Participants also had
significantly higher fixation rates on manipulation for the HoloLens
condition than the Sketchfab condition [Z =8.9195, p=0.0028].
5.2.2 Fixation Duration. We found no evidence that the fixation
duration on the artifact [X 2(2)=2.2405, p=0.3262] or description
[X 2(2)=14.6945, p=0.0191] were different between the three con-
ditions. However, the t-test results showed that the duration of
fixations on the manipulation AOI was significantly higher for
the HoloLens condition that the Sketchfab condition [Z=5.4896,
p=<0.0006]. Note that there is no separate manipulation AOI for
the 3D printed condition.
5.3 Learning Outcomes
We evaluated learning outcomes by counting the number of content
codes in the responses to the question asking participants to write
down the details they noticed while interacting with the artifact.
We found no evidence that the total number of content codes ap-
pearing in the responses were different between the conditions [F
(2,27) = 1.552, p= 0.8570]. On performing ANOVA on the frequency
of mentioning of the individual content codes, we observed that
the facial feature and detail code of the visual observation cate-
gory were significantly different among the conditions. Post hoc
testing indicated facial feature was mentioned significantly more
often with 3D prints than the other two conditions. Detail was also
mentioned significantly less with HoloLens than in the 3D prints
and Sketchfab conditions. Rest of the content codes did not show
significant difference.
5.4 Perceived Workload and Spatial Presence
There was a significant difference in the perceived workload be-
tween conditions [F (2, 27) = 5.7838, p= 0.0081]. Post hoc test
suggested that the participants in the 3D prints condition expe-
rienced significantly higher effort. Users in the HoloLens condi-
tion felt as if the original artifact was physically present in their
environment significantly more than users in the other two condi-
tions [X 2(2)=6.3786, p=0.0412]. Participants also claimed to think
more intensely about the characteristics of the 3D printed artifacts
[X 2(2)=6.7055, p=0.0350].
Figure 6: Timepercentage distribution for users’ gaze among
the three areas of interest(AOI) for each condition.
6 DISCUSSION
6.1 Comparison with The Original Study
The time measured in the original study was the overall time spent
on the task. Using eye tracking, we were able to classify the total
time spent to multiple categories. This enabled us to draw a clear
picture of how users distributed their time between analyzing the
object, reading about it, and manipulating it. Figure 6 and 7 show
this distribution for all three conditions. Our results confirm the re-
sults of the original paper in multiple aspects. Both studies found no
significant difference in the complexity score of the open question
responses about the artifact they viewed. Another common find-
ing was that participants of both studies confirmed the immersive
nature of AR by ranking it the highest when asked if they "felt as
though the original ancient artifact was physically present in [their]
environment". This is despite the fact that 3D printed artifacts were
the only ones to include a sense of touch and to exist physically in
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Figure 7: Fixations per minute for each condition.
the environment for the learners. This result suggests a new line of
investigation, reconsidering Montessori’s finding emphasizing the
role of physical material in learning[24]. The total complexity score
of the open question responses was comparable among conditions
for both studies, However, there were differences with the original
study in the particular thematic codes appeared in the responses.
The original paper showed that the 3D printed condition was sig-
nificantly lower in mentions of color, material, and context. Our
study did not show such differences among conditions. The reason
for this result is not immediately forthcoming; one possibility is
difference between participant populations across the two studies,
as the studies were conducted at different institutions. Fixations
indicate maintaining gaze at a gaze target, during which almost all
the visual information is collected [9, 35, 37]. The rate of fixations
on the artifact was lowest for the HoloLens condition while the
fixation duration was comparable among conditions. Both of the
studies had significantly fewer mentions of facial features in the
open question responses for the HoloLens condition. It is likely that
both the fewer mentions of facial features, and the lower fixation
rate are related to two innate features of the holograms: they have
lower resolution compared to the Sketchfab condition and are not
tactile like the 3D prints condition.
6.2 Physical Artifact vs. Virtual Artifact
Prior research indicates that users have different psychological
responses to virtual and tangible objects[1]. However, studies com-
paring visual behavior for physical and virtual versions of the same
task are surprisingly uncommon [22]. One of our contributions is
making this comparison. Users in the HoloLens condition spent
significantly more time completing the task, however, the total time
they spent looking at the object and their object fixation duration
was comparable to the other conditions. This is an indication that
users’ visual behavior towards virtual learning material is similar
to tangible ones. This result supports users’ claim about the immer-
sive nature of the HoloLens condition; in other words, it seems that
participants appreciated the virtual artifacts like the physical ones.
6.3 Interface and Design Implications
Participants reported comparable satisfaction for tangible and vir-
tual interaction types despite technology limitations for current
AR equipment. Such limitations like the low resolution, narrow
filed of view, and the novelty of the equipment (even though they
were trained on how to use HoloLens) posed interaction constraints
which participants had to overcome in order to interact with the
artifacts. Thus, we are likely to see higher satisfaction measures for
the HoloLens condition if interaction becomes more seamless in fu-
ture products. For example, we observed that the clicking gesture in
the AR environment is easier for the users to perform than the drag-
ging gesture. In fact, by visually inspecting the HoloLens videos,
we observed that the higher gaze time and fixation duration for
manipulation in the HoloLens condition were due to participants’
difficulty performing the dragging gesture. Thus, one possible im-
provement to the interface could be to change how users rotate
artifacts: instead of using the dragging gesture, they might prefer
to click on a bar that controls object rotation.
Research has shown that interaction costs can lead to increased
reflection on the material[9, 26, 36, 38]. Moreover, Marshall claims
that the easy manipulation of concrete objects can result in de-
creased reflection on the learning material [22]. As discussed, the
HoloLens condition introduced interaction constraint to the par-
ticipants. However, in the 3D prints condition users reported that
they "thought intensely about the characteristics of the ancient
artifact" considerably higher than the other conditions. Based on
Marshall’s work[22], we expected that participants would report
higher thought intensity in the HoloLens condition than in the 3D
prints condition, where manipulation was the easiest. This implies
that the manipulation effort required in the HoloLens condition
might have been too high; this implication is also supported by
the fact that participants spent the most time gazing at the ma-
nipulation AOI in this condition. Although manipulation for the
Sketchfab condition was more complicated than handling the 3D
printed artifacts, the Sketchfab condition did not provide the im-
mersive experience for the users which might have been needed
7 LIMITATIONS
One limitation of our detection algorithm is that a minimum color
contrast has to be maintained between the 3D printed object and
background. However, in the future, we anticipate that 3D printed
objects will include color, Hence, future work includes the use of
machine learning algorithms to identify various AOI. Although a
rare occurrence in our study, another challenge was eye trackers
heating up after long usage, creating discomfort for users.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
By replicating and extending the original study by Pollalis et al.
we were able to gain a thorough understanding of users’ visual
behavior for the purpose of enhancing object-based learning. By
adding eye tracking we found that users’ visual behavior towards
virtual learning material is similar to tangible ones. As mentioned
above, users spent a significant amount of time looking at the
manipulation features of the HoloLens interface. This highlights a
need to further explore the role of physical manipulation in learning.
We plan to extend this study to analyze collaborative object-based
learning and how different interaction styles facilitate collaborative
object-based learning.
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ABSTRACT
Individual and organizational computer security rests on how peo-
ple interpret and use the security information they are presented.
One challenge is determining whether a given URL is safe or not.
This paper explores the visual behaviors that users employ to gauge
URL safety. We conducted a user study on 20 participants wherein
participants classified URLs as safe or unsafe while wearing an eye
tracker that recorded eye gaze (where they look) and pupil dilation
(a proxy for cognitive effort). Among other things, our findings
suggest that: users have a cap on the amount of cognitive resources
they are willing to expend on vetting a URL; they tend to believe
that the presence of www in the domain name indicates that the
URL is safe; and they do not carefully parse the URL beyond what
they perceive as the domain name.
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1 INTRODUCTION
As people surf the web, check their email, and do other computer-
related tasks, they interact with web addresses or Uniform Resource
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Locators (URLs) [Wikipedia contributors 2019c]. Unfortunately,
URLs do not only serve legitimate content; bad actors may use
URLs under their control to conduct attacks, e.g., to serve malware
or steal credentials by masquerading as a legitimate service. Thus,
users must be vigilant. Trusting an unsafe URL could present a
security threat to the individual or their organization. Yet users
don’t want to ignore safe URLs either. This problem is compounded
by user misperceptions of URL syntax, the sheer time required to
vet URLs, and some practices of legitimate services (e.g., use of URL
redirectors). These factors make it very difficult for users to vet
URLs. Consequently, many attacks rely on the victim unwittingly
clicking on a malicious URL.
From a security standpoint, it is critical to safeguard users from
malicious websites. And so, numerous solutions have been devel-
oped. Some companies specialize in security training for users
(e.g., [KnowBe4 2019; Proofpoint 2019b]). Others focus on limiting
user exposure to unsafe URLs: Products and services like Microsoft
Office 365 APT Safelinks [Microsoft 2019] and Proofpoint URLDe-
fense [Proofpoint 2019a] check for malicious content served by
URLs before allowing users to visit them. Some browsers similarly
warn the user when they detect unsafe URLs (e.g., [Mozilla 2019]).
There is also abundant research on why users fall for URL-based
phishing attacks (e.g., [Dhamija et al. 2006; Hong et al. 2013]), on
training techniques (e.g., [Kumaraguru et al. 2009; Miyamoto et al.
2014; Wen et al. 2019]), and on defenses (e.g., [Fette et al. 2007; Mau-
rer et al. 2011]), as well as other foci. However, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study that solely focuses on understand-
ing users’ visual attention as they process URLs. Studying users’
visual attention while processing URLs allows us to determine why
certain attacks succeed, to measure the influence of URL charac-
teristics on visual processing and cognition, and to determine the
efficacy of countermeasures.
The work presented here serves as a first step toward developing
a descriptive model of the relationship between URL characteris-
tics and user visual behavior. We conducted a user study where
users were asked to classify URLs as safe or unsafe while wearing
an eye tracker. One key finding is that participants spent more
time on processing URLs as URL length increased but only up to a
point. Another is that participants relied more upon the authority
component of URLs than any other component.
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2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Eye Tracking and Reading
Eye tracking is considered to be a window into users’ cognitive
states [König et al. 2016; Reichle et al. 2012]. It has been employed
to assess cognitive load [Palinko et al. 2010; Pappusetty et al. 2017;
Pomplun and Sunkara 2003; Zagermann et al. 2016], reading strate-
gies [Beymer et al. 2008; Hyönä et al. 2002, 2003; Rayner et al. 2006],
and design implications [Bergstrom and Schall 2014; Goldberg et al.
2002]. We study users’ eyes as they process URLs.
Users assess the safety of a URL by reading. The amount of visual
attention given while reading reflects moment-to-moment cogni-
tive processing [Rayner 1998; Zagermann et al. 2016]. Researchers
have sought to examine the relationships between reading and eye
movements by using measures like fixations, saccades, regressions,
and backtracks [Beymer and Russell 2005; Sibert et al. 2000]. Fixa-
tions are pauses in eye movements during which new information is
acquired. Research has shown that users fixate longer while reading
when “the processing load is greater” [Just and Carpenter 1980].
Reading and scanning text differs with respect to fixations and
word skipping [Rayner and Fischer 1996]. When and where some-
one looks next while reading is influenced by the reader’s ongoing
mental processing [Rayner and Fischer 1996]. Six commonly used
eye-tracking measures are: fixation count, fixation count on vari-
ous areas of interest (AOIs), proportion of time spent on each AOI,
average fixation duration, fixation rate (fixation count/second), and
gaze duration mean on each AOI [Lai et al. 2013]. We used all these
measures, as well as pupil dilation and backtrack fixation count.
2.2 Pupil Dilation and Cognitive Load
As users read and evaluate URLs, they use cognitive resources. A
common measure of cognitive load is pupil dilation [Kun et al. 2013;
Palinko et al. 2010; Poole and Ball 2006]. When users face challeng-
ing tasks, their pupils dilate on the order of 0.1 to 0.5 mm [Beatty
1982; Pfleging et al. 2016]. This task-evoked pupillary response
(TEPR) indicates the cognitive load of the task. However, pupil
dilation is also influenced by other factors like the amount of light
entering the pupil (pupillary light reflex) [Palinko and Kun 2012;
Pfleging et al. 2016] and one’s emotional state [Bradley et al. 2008;
Stanners et al. 1979; Xu et al. 2011]. To reduce these effects, we
conducted the experiment in a windowless light-controlled room.
2.3 Neutral Mood Induction
Mood can affect a person’s ability to comprehend text and their
judgment [Bohn-Gettler and Rapp 2011; Forgas 1989]. Mood induc-
tion is used to understand and reduce the effect of mood [Mills
et al. 2019]. Watching a film or a story is one of the most effective
mood induction techniques [Westermann et al. 1996]. To reduce
the effect of mood and improve replicability, we had participants
watch a video chosen to induce a neutral mood.
2.4 URL Security and Phishing
Phishing is the act of masquerading as a legitimate entity to gather
sensitive user information [Wikipedia contributors 2019b]. Adver-
saries often use URL obfuscation to carry out phishing attacks. In
fact, URL security is primarily studied in relation to phishing.
Researchers have studied the efficacy of different phishing tech-
niques and demographic factors affecting phishing susceptibil-
ity [Dhamija et al. 2006; Downs et al. 2007; Hong et al. 2013; Sheng
et al. 2010; Wu et al. 2006]; the impact of psychological manipu-
lation on phishing susceptibility [Goel et al. 2017]; and the effect
of communication medium on phishing susceptibility [Benenson
et al. 2017; Benenson et al. 2014]. Phishing and URL obfuscation
techniques have been categorized, e.g., [Althobaiti et al. 2019; Drake
et al. 2004; Ollmann 2004]. However, there are also (ostensibly) le-
gitimate reasons to obfuscate or otherwise break user expectations
of where URLs go, e.g., URL redirection [Wikipedia contributors
2019d], tracking links [Cyphers et al. 2018]. Researchers have devel-
oped and compared phishing training approaches and educational
materials [Arachchilage et al. 2016; Kumaraguru et al. 2007; Sheng
et al. 2010, 2007; Stockhardt et al. 2016; Wen et al. 2019]. Companies
even provide security training [KnowBe4 2019; PhishingBox 2019;
PhishLabs 2019; Proofpoint 2019b; SANS 2019a,b].
Many defenses have also been pursued. Researchers have: com-
pared browser indicators and warnings [Dhamija et al. 2006; Egel-
man et al. 2008]; developed ways to effectively convey security
information [Maurer et al. 2011; Schechter et al. 2007]; and studied
ML approaches for email filtering and URL classification [Almo-
mani et al. 2013; Bergholz et al. 2010; Blum et al. 2010; Fette et al.
2007]. Browsers [Mozilla 2019] and search engines [Whittaker et al.
2010] use blacklists and other techniques to protect users. Some
products vet URLs in emails before allowing user access, e.g., [Mi-
crosoft 2019; Proofpoint 2019a]. However, these defenses are not
always foolproof, e.g., [Nathaniel 2017].
Recently, there has been growing interest in using eye trackers
for usable security. An eye-tracking based system was developed to
train users to look at the status bar [Miyamoto et al. 2014]. Another
study involved participants classifying websites, not just URLs,
while wearing an eye tracker to examine how users gauge web-
site legitimacy and evaluate security indicators [Alsharnouby et al.
2015]. Our study is similar in spirit. However, we exclusively fo-
cus on how users visually process URLs. This narrow focus lets us
dissect URLs into smaller components and examine how people
process them. We seek to understand which parts people pay atten-
tion to, when people give up, and how their eyes process different
URLs, amongst other things.
2.5 A Brief Introduction to URL Structure
A uniform resource locator (URL) is a string of characters that spec-
ifies the location of a web resource and how to access it [Wikipedia
contributors 2019c]. The original URL specification details URL
structure [Berners-Lee et al. 1994]. Here, we present the bare es-
sentials of URL structure at an appropriate level of granularity to
understand our work.1
Each URL in our corpus has the form:
<scheme>://<authority><rest>
The scheme component [Berners-Lee et al. 1998, 1994;WHATWG
2019] corresponds to the scheme name, which specifies how to in-
terpret the text following the colon. Common schemes are http, ftp,
and file. Every URL in our corpus uses the https scheme.
1A more thorough treatment of URLs can be found in URL and URI specifications and
standards [Berners-Lee et al. 1998, 1994; WHATWG 2019].
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Table 1: Disaggregation of a URL into its three components.
scheme delims. authority rest
https :// www.google.com /forms/about/
The authority component specifies a subset of the host, port,
username, and password [Berners-Lee et al. 1998; WHATWG 2019].
For URLs in our corpus„ the authority component has either the
form host or user@hostwhere host represents the host and user
represents the username. In this study, the host is always a fully
qualified domain name (e.g., www.wikipedia.org) - “a sequence of
domain labels separated by ‘.’ ” [Berners-Lee et al. 1994]. The last
domain label is the top-level domain. For URLs in our corpus, the
authority component comprises everything following the leading
https:// until either the next /, if present, or the end of the line.
We call the last component rest, a catch-all term that is not
borrowed from any specification or standard. It captures every-
thing following the authority component. The rest component
includes the path [Berners-Lee et al. 1998, 1994; WHATWG 2019],
which may be empty; it may also include queries, fragments, and
accompanying delimiters [Berners-Lee et al. 1998, 1994; WHATWG
2019]. For every URL in our corpus, if the rest component is non-
empty, it includes a path that “[identifies] the resource within the
scope of [the] scheme and authority” [Berners-Lee et al. 1998], it
begins at the first / character following the authority component,
and it is the last part of the URL. Table 1 provides an example of a
URL disaggregation into these three components. Please note the
formatting style used for these components. Later, we define areas
of interest of the same names but different formatting styles.
3 STUDY OUTLINE
Our long-term goal is to understand users’ visual behaviors (and
the underlying cognitive processes they manifest) as they process,
interpret, and operationalize security information (including in-
formation embedded in URLs) when making security decisions.
Identifying which factors affect visual behavior and how they affect
it is vital in informing security solutions. Such information can be
used to improve security awareness training or to better design
user interfaces that aid in decision-making.
The work presented in this paper is one step towards this long-
term goal. We aim to capture how some URL properties affect visual
behaviors. We attempt to control for other factors, but we do not
explore them in this initial study.We propose hypotheses pertaining
to how various aspects of a URL affect visual processing of the URL,
test these hypotheses, and observe trends in users’ visual behaviors.
3.1 Hypotheses
We created hypotheses to examine how users visually process URLs
and how URL features affect this processing:
H1: Total time spent on processing a URL is longer for complex
URLs than it is for simple URLs.
H2: Total time spent on processing a URL, normalized by the
URL length, is shorter for complex URLs than it is for simple URLs.
H3: There exists a URL length threshold over which increasing
URL length does not result in more time being spent on processing
URLs.
Figure 1: The left side of the figure is a processed frame
from the eye tracker video (This is not the same as what the
participant sees). The red cursor indicates gaze position and
the four colored boxes represent four AOIs: the scheme AOI
(red), the authority AOI (green), the rest AOI (blue), and the
response AOI (yellow). The right side is an image of a partic-
ipant performing the task wearing the eye tracker.
H4: Total time spent on the scheme per character is less than
that of the authority and rest components.
H5: For URLs that have an authority component of form
user@host where user ends with “.com”, participants spend sig-
nificantly more time per character looking at the user component
than the host component.
4 METHOD
4.1 URL Corpus and Classification
We created a URL corpus comprising 64 URLs partitioned into
8 categories.2 Categories are defined by features corresponding
to (1) safety, (2) complexity, (3) a leading www in the authority
component, and (4) the attack type for unsafe URLs. The corpus
contains 8 URLs for each of the 8 categories. To reduce variability
and maintain uniformity between categories, every URL uses https
as the scheme component and com as the top-level domain.
The categories are defined by the following 4 features:
4.1.1 Safety: URLs that are safe use domain names associated with
popular services within the USA, such as Facebook. We selected
the fully qualified domain names used in these URLs primarily
from the top 1,000 US websites in the Quantcast Top One Million
list3, although we consulted other lists as well. For the subset that
were complex and included rest components, we chose the rest
components by searching for legitimate content served by these
domain names.
URLs that are unsafe have fully qualified domain names that, at
the time of corpus construction, were eligible for purchase, did not
have a domain name server record, or were spoofed websites. While
many URLs with the unsafe feature were not actually unsafe to visit,
it is exceedingly unlikely that participants would be knowledgeable
about the status of the URLs tagged as unsafe, and, if an adversary
wished to acquire the corresponding domains, they could do so.
This decision allowed for greater control over the corpus.
2Materials used in this study can be found at https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/
1ZNMLoXBxOU4R2nela-6d7MxsaQGrdyg4
3https://www.quantcast.com/top-sites
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Table 2: Mean values and standard deviations of measurements for the eight URL categories (not normalized by length).
Category Safety Complexity www Attack Type URL Length Time Spent Score Fix. Ct. Backtracking Fix. Ct.
C1 safe simple www N/A 25.0 (4.8) 4.1 (2.3) 7.2 (1.1) 7.9 (4.9) 1.9 (1.8)
C2 safe simple non-www N/A 19.8 (2.0) 4.0 (1.9) 3.8 (2.3) 7.1 (4.3) 1.6 (1.5)
C3 safe complex www N/A 124.0 (13.2) 7.5 (3.8) 5.8 (1.5) 15.3 (8.2) 3.7 (3.1)
C4 safe complex non-www N/A 105.3 (13.5) 7.9 (4.2) 4.4 (1.5) 15.9 (9.0) 4.1 (3.8)
C5 unsafe simple www positive 28.5 (2.4) 5.4 (2.1) 4.4 (2.8) 9.5 (4.7) 2.4 (1.9)
C6 unsafe simple www negative 29.3 (3.6) 4.8 (1.9) 5.9 (2.2) 9.2 (4.9) 2.4 (2.0)
C7 unsafe complex non-www substring 96.0 (20.4) 7.4 (4.0) 5.5 (2.1) 14.5 (8.3) 3.7 (3.2)
C8 unsafe complex www user@host 95.0 (17.4) 6.3 (3.4) 3.4 (2.4) 12.6 (7.4) 3.2 (3.2)
4.1.2 Complexity: URLs were grouped into two complexity classes:
simple and complex. We define complexity in terms of (a) URL length
and (b) URL features. A URL is simple if it is at most 36 characters
long and does not contain a rest component. A URL is complex if
it is at least 48 characters long and contains a non-empty path; it
may also contain queries and fragments.
4.1.3 Presence of www: URLs with the www attribute begin with
https://www. URLs with the non-www attribute do not.
4.1.4 Attack Type: We chose to explore four conditions for unsafe
URLs. They are neither exhaustive nor fully representative of real-
world attacks. Rather, our aim was to explore a variety of conditions
that may affect visual behaviors and/or classification:
• positive: The fully qualified domain name contains positive
or feel-good words or phrases, e.g., “happy”, “bliss”.
• negative: The fully qualified domain name contains words
or phrases with a negative, technical, or a security connota-
tion, e.g., “malware”, “antivirus”, “techsupport”.
• substring: The fully qualified domain name has the form
https://X.Y.com where https://X.com is a safe URL.
• user@host: The authority component has form www.X.
com@Y where https://www.X.com is a legitimate URL. More-
over, some of the last four characters of Y are obfuscated
using a hexadecimal representation, e.g., representing “.com”
as “.%63o%6D”.
The eight URL categories are presented in Table 2. In Section 4.5,
we will discuss the measures in this table.
4.2 Experimental Design and Task
We conducted a within-subject experiment that was approved by
the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Each of the 20 participants
were shown the 64 URLs from the corpus over two sessions. The task
was to classify each URL as safe or unsafe. Participants completed
this task by viewing one URL at a time and clicking a button on the
GUI to indicate whether they believed the URL was safe.
The URL corpus was split into two equal-sized sets presented
over two sessions, such that four URLs from each category were
represented in each set. For each session, the order in which URLs
were presented was randomly determined but held fixed for all par-
ticipants. However, session order alternated between participants.
4.3 Data Collection, Processing, & Analysis
We discuss the participant selection, the GUI, data collection, data
processing, and data analysis:
4.3.1 Participants: We collected data from 20 participants (3 female,
mean age = 22.68, SD = 2.65). All participants were students who
participated in the user study as part of their coursework. We
discarded data from 4 participants due to technical issues with the
data extraction from the eye tracker. Hence, we report on the data
from 16 participants (2 female).
4.3.2 User interface: The application was created using GUIs in
MATLAB. It was presented to participants on a 24” monitor with a
resolution of 1920x1200. Each URL image was created using bold
monospace font [Wikipedia contributors 2019a] of size 64. The
screen was made up of two panes. The first included the URL image,
which was scaled and displayed on screen over 2-7 lines with a
full line having approximate height of 20mm and width of 280mm.
The second pane included the question “Is the web address safe
to visit?”, accompanied by two response buttons that read “Safe”
and “Unsafe” (see Figure 1). Four markers were embedded in the
application to identify the surface plane to mark various AOIs
during post-processing of the eye-tracking data. Times of clicks
and corresponding classifications/responses captured via button
clicks were also recorded.
4.3.3 Eye Tracking: Weused the head-mountedDikablis eye tracker
to collect gaze positions. It contains three cameras: two eye cam-
eras sampling the eye at 60 Hz and a scene camera sampling at
30 Hz. Gaze positions are computed from the pupil movements
and mapped onto the video from the scene camera. Establishing a
mathematical mapping between the features of eye and the target
being looked at is referred to as calibration. We used the four-point
operator-controlled calibration method [Nyström et al. 2013].
4.3.4 Post-task questionnaire: Following the URL classification
task, the participant filled in a questionnaire comprising: demo-
graphics questions; questions pertaining to security knowledge and
behaviors, especially regarding URLs and phishing; and questions
to help assess experimental validity.
4.3.5 Data Analysis: We used MATLAB for post-processing the
eye-tracking data. We used JMP Pro 14 and R for statistical analy-
sis. The Shapiro-Wilk test indicated that all of our data were non-
normally distributed, thus we used non-parametric tests (Kruskal-
Wallis test and Wilcoxon test) for analysis.
4.4 Procedure
After signing the consent form, the participant was given a brief
introduction to the study and the user interface. They then saw
a short neutral mood induction video to control for the effects of
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Table 3: Disaggregation of a URL in accordance with the first
three AOIs. This differs from Table 1 in that the scheme AOI
includes the “://” following the scheme.
scheme AOI authority AOI rest AOI
https:// www.google.com /forms/about/
mood. They then filled in a pre-task questionnaire to assess their
mood [Schaefer et al. 2010], wore the eye tracker, and completed a
practice trial to familiarize themselves with the task and the GUI.
Before calibration, we adjusted a nose pin and head band to re-
duce the movement of the eye tracker during the study; we did not
use a chin rest. Next, we focused the eye and scene cameras and
calibrated the eye tracker using the four-point operator-controlled
calibration method. The participant then classified URLs for the
first session and took a break. The calibration procedure was then
repeated and the participant classified URLs for the second ses-
sion. Last, they filled in the post-task questionnaire. The distance
between the screen and the participant was kept at about 0.6 meters.
4.5 Measures
4.5.1 Mood: Each participant’s mood was assessed along six emo-
tional states: awake, pleasant, angry, fearful, happy, and sad [Mills
et al. 2019]. The assessment used a 10-point scale, where 1 indi-
cated that the participant’s mood was not associated with the given
emotional state, and 10 indicated that it was highly associated.
4.5.2 Score: The score represents the number of correctly classi-
fied URLs within a set with no penalty for incorrect classification.
4.5.3 Total Time Spent: The total time spent on classifying a URL
is the time (seconds) from the presentation of the URL to the time
when the user clicks on a button to classify it. This is a proxy for
the cumulative effort and engagement in classifying the URL.
4.5.4 Time Spent on Areas of Interest: Using the UTC timestamps
of each data point recorded by the eye tracker, we computed the
percentage dwell time on five AOIs (Areas of Interest). These mea-
sures express the distribution of users’ visual attention and help us
understand which URL components users use to gauge URL safety.
We examined five AOIs. Figure 1 captures the first four AOIs and
Table 3 gives a disaggregation of a URL in accordance with the
AOIs that correspond to the URL. We now present the five AOIs.
• The scheme AOI captures the scheme component and the
delimiters immediately following it. As every URL in our
corpus uses the https as the scheme, this AOI always corre-
sponds to the leading https:// in the URL.
• The authority AOI captures the authority component.
For classes C1 through C7, the authority component is
a fully qualified domain name, e.g., www.google.com is the
authority component of https://www.google.com. For class
C8, the authority component has form user@host, e.g., as
inwww.google.com@evil.com. To testH5, the authority AOI
was further split into two smaller AOIs, theuser AOI and the
host AOI corresponding to the user and host components.
• The rest AOI captures the rest component.
• The response AOI captures the response portion of the
screen containing the “Safe” and “Unsafe” buttons.
Table 4: Probabilities of correctly classifying safe URLs
given the participant knew of the service.
Probabilities P[correct|known] P[correct|unknown]
C1 ( simple, www) 0.92 0.63
C2 ( simple, non-www) 0.83 0.19
C3 ( complex, www) 0.76 0.5
C4 ( complex, non-www) 0.58 0.46
• The last AOI captured visual targets other than the previous
four areas of interest.
4.5.5 Fixations and Backtracking Fixations: Fixating is the act of
maintaining one’s gaze at a particular target for a certain duration
of time. It represents the time where new information is gath-
ered [Ramkumar et al. 2019]. We extracted fixations of 100ms or
more following prior research guidelines [Irwin and Zelinsky 2002;
Munn et al. 2008; Salvucci and Goldberg 2000].
Backtracking is the process of revisiting information that was
previously processed or skipped [Bruneau et al. 2002]. It usually oc-
curs to re-establish previously processed information or it signifies
a cognitive interest in an area with respect to the given task [Burton
and Daneman 2007]. We measured the backtrack fixation count,
i.e., the number of fixations involving backtracking.
4.5.6 Normalized Pupil Area: : The eye tracker records raw pupil
area of both eyes in pixels.We used the right eye pupil area.We used
the Hampel identifier technique to remove outliers [Foroughi et
al.2017; Pearson et al. 2016]. Due to the non-uniform sampling rate,
we interpolated the data to obtain a uniform sampling frequency
of 60 Hz [Pfleging et al. 2016]. Then, we normalized the data to
compare it between participants.
4.5.7 Accounting for Length Differences in URLs: URLs may differ
in the number of characters in their scheme, authority, and rest
components. Thus, for the corresponding AOIs, we calculated the
time spent per character (total time spent on AOI divided by number
of characters in AOI) and the fixation count per character (total
number of fixations occurring on AOI divided by total number
of characters in AOI). For the overall comparison, we computed
overall time spent per character (total time spent/total URL length),
overall fixation count per character (total fixation count/total URL
length), and backtrack fixation count as a function of URL length
(total backtrack fixations/total URL length).
5 RESULTS
5.1 Mood Induction Measures
On average participants were awake (ranking of M=7.50, SD=1.59),
felt relatively pleasant (M=7.69, SD=1.40), and were mildly happy
(M=6.75, SD=1.44). They did not feel angry (M=1.81, SD=0.83), fear-
ful (M=1.56, SD=1.09), or sad (M=1.50, SD=0.82).
5.2 Scores
The average score was 40.44 out of 64. From the post-task question-
naire, we were able to identify whether the participants knew of
the services associated with the safe URLs. Table 4 indicates the
probabilities of participants correctly classifying the URL given that
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Figure 2: Time spent per character to classify URL vs. URL
length with linear regression lines.
they knew the service. The Kruskal-Wallis test showed no signifi-
cant difference between the four categories of safe URLs (C1-C4) in
terms of the participant knowing the services associated with the
domain names [𝑋 2(3)=6.9674, p=0.0729].
5.3 Overview of Eye-Tracking Results
Table 2 presents some key results. The overall distribution of vi-
sual attention on the AOIs is shown in Figure 6. Using Kruskal-
Wallis test, we found that the time spent per character was sig-
nificantly different between the three AOIs corresponding to the
URL [𝑋 2(2)=30.4152, p<0.0001]. Post hoc analysis indicated time
spent per character on the authority AOI was significantly higher
than that of the scheme AOI and that of the rest AOI. The fixa-
tion count per character was significantly different between the
three AOIs [Kruskal-Wallis test: 𝑋 2(2)=23.9356, p<0.0001]. Post hoc
analysis indicated that fixation count per character on the rest AOI
was significantly lower than the other two. However, we found no
evidence that fixation duration was significantly different between
the three AOIs [Kruskal-Wallis test: 𝑋 2(2)=3.1692, p=0.0516].
The Kruskal-Wallis test indicated a significant difference in nor-
malized pupil area [𝑋 2(2)=8.7532, p=0.0126]. Post hoc analysis indi-
cated a lower pupil area for the scheme AOI relative to other AOIs,
suggesting less cognitive effort was expended on the scheme AOI.
5.4 Complexity
We saw a significant difference in overall time spent (seconds) pro-
cessing between complex and simple URLs [Wilcoxon test: Z=3.4865,
p=0.0005]. More time was spent on complex URLs (M=7.26, SD=2.41)
compared to simple URLs (M=4.58, SD=1.35). This can also be seen
pictorially in Figure 4. Wilcoxon test indicated significant differ-
ences in overall time spent per character [Z=8.9998, p<0.0001], over-
all fixation count per character [Z=6.4883, p<0.0001], and backtrack
fixation count as a function of URL length [Z=4.4399, p<0.0001].
People spent less time per character on complex URLs (M=0.06,
SD=0.01) than simple URLs (M=0.13, SD=0.04). Figure 2 shows the
time spent per character decreases as URL length increases. Also,
the fixation count per character was smaller for complex URLs
(M=0.12, SD=0.04) than for simple URLs (M=0.22, SD=0.10). Figure 3
shows a decrease in fixation count per character as URL length
Figure 3: Fixation count per character vs. URL length with a
linear regression line.
increases. But the backtrack fixation count was higher on complex
URLs (M=3.68, SD=2.44) relative to simple ones (M=2.08, SD=1.18).
We found no significant difference in the score between complex
(M=4.76, SD=2.10) and simple URLs (M=5.34, SD=2.51). Examining
complex URLs of different lengths tells a more nuanced story. Fig-
ure 5 suggests a peak in time spent per character that occurs near
100 characters. We observed similar trends with fixation count per
character and backtrack fixation count as a function of URL length
for complex URLs.
5.5 Existence of www
We compared safe URLs that have authority components that
begin with www (C1&C3) to those that do not (C2&C4). Wilcoxon
test results indicated a significant difference in time spent per char-
acter on the authority AOI betweenwww URLs (M=0.16, SD=0.04)
and non-www URLs (M=0.21, SD=0.04); [Z=4.2094, p<0.0001]. Also,
there was a significant difference in the fixation count per charac-
ter on the authority AOI between www URLs (M=0.24, SD=0.09)
and non-www URLs (M=0.34, SD=0.12); [Wilcoxon test: Z=3.2292,
p=0.0012]. The score obtained (maximum score: 8) was also signifi-
cantly different between www URLs (M=6.50, SD=1.48) and non-
www URLs (M=4.09, SD=1.90); [Wilcoxon test: Z=4.7020, p<0.001].
Figure 4: Time spent to classify URL vs. URL length with
linear regression lines for simple and complex URLs.
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Figure 5: Time spent to classify URLs vs. URL length with
two linear regression lines for data points separated by the
median URL length (complex URLs).
5.6 User@Host Attack Type vs. Regular URLs
To examine user visual attention for the user@host URLs (C8), we
considered two special AOIs at a finer granularity than the author-
ity AOI : the user AOI and host AOI. We compared measurements
on these two AOIs for the user@host URLs (C8) to those for the
authority AOI for safe URLs of similar structure (C3). Using the
Kruskal-Wallis test we found a significant difference on time spent
per character between the authority AOI of C3, the user AOI of
C8, and the host AOI of C8 [𝑋 2(2)=32.1735, p<0.0001]. A signifi-
cant difference was also observed with fixation count per character
[Kruskal-Wallis test: 𝑋 2(2)=11.3323, p=0.0035]. Post hoc analysis
indicated that both sets of measurements for the host AOI for C8
were lower than those of the user AOI for C8 and the authority
AOI for C3; the measurements between the user AOI for C8 were
comparable to those of the authority AOI for C3. These results
suggests that users process the user AOI of C8 and the authority
AOI of C3 similarly. Also, there was a significant difference in the
score between the user@host attack type (M=3.37, SD=2.41) and
safe URLs of similar structure (M=5.81, SD=1.51); [Wilcoxon test:
Z=2.9176, p=0.0035].
6 DISCUSSION
First, participant responses to the pre-task questionnaire following
the mood induction video [Schaefer et al. 2010] indicate they were
Figure 6: Percentage of time distribution on various AOIs.
awake and in a neutral mood. Responses to the post-task ques-
tionnaire reveal that participants did not fatigue, and, on average,
correctly identified the safety of about 40 of the 64 URLs (63%).
Let us now turn to a detailed discussion of the results.
6.1 URL Processing & Classification Factors
6.1.1 URL Length: The overall time spent on classifying simple
(and shorter) URLs (C1, C2, C5, C6) was less than the total time
spent on classifying complex (and longer) URLs (C3, C4, C7, C8).
This weakly supports H1, though follow-up work must be done to
disentangle length from other complexity factors.
For complex URLs, we found URL length negatively correlated
with time spent per character and fixation count per character. This
supports H2.
We did not observe a correlation between URL length and score.
Also, while Figure 4 suggests participants spent more time parsing
URLs as URL length increases, Figure 2 suggests time spent per
character decreases as we increase URL length. Moreover, the posi-
tive correlation between URL length and time spent seems to cease
at a point, which supports H3. Specifically, Figure 5 suggests that
at a threshold of approximately 100 characters, time spent stops
increasing as we increase URL length. Similar trends were observed
with fixation count per character and backtrack fixation count per
character. We also observed no statistical difference between time
spent on complex URLs under 100 characters and those above. One
interpretation is captured by a notion similar to that of the com-
pliance budget proposed by Beautement et al. [Beautement et al.
2008]: the user may only expend a finite budget of resources (here,
time is a proxy for expended resources) to classify a URL, and, if
the resources required to fully process a URL exceeds this budget,
the user will not expend them. While the peculiarities of where
that threshold is may depend on factors other than just URL length,
we expect this notion of a finite budget applies more generally.
6.1.2 AOI:. We examine the influence of the AOIs:
• Scheme AOI: The decrease in the pupil area for the scheme
AOI indicates reduced cognitive attention. Previous work
found the frequency with which a user encounters a word af-
fects the fixation duration and processing of that word [Rayner
and Duffy 1986]. Users usually spend less time on frequently
encountered words. Most legitimate websites use https nowa-
days, which is also used in each of the 64 URLs in our corpus.
This explains the decrease in cognitive load for the scheme
AOI. We observed a statistically significant difference in time
spent per character between the scheme AOI and the au-
thority AOI (with the latter being higher); however, we did
not observe such a difference for the scheme AOI and the
rest AOI. Therefore, we do not have evidence to support H4.
• Authority AOI: The results indicate the time spent per char-
acter on the authority AOI is significantly higher than that
of other AOIs. Time spent and fixation count per character
on the authority AOI suggests users find www at the be-
ginning of the domain name to be a strong indicator of URL
safety.
• Rest AOI: Reduced fixation count while reading is char-
acteristic of scanning text [Rayner and Fischer 1996]. The
fixation count per character for the rest AOI is significantly
ETRA ’20 Full Papers, June 2–5, 2020, Stuttgart, Germany Ramkumar et al.
lower than it is for other AOIs, which suggests participants
scanned the rest AOI.
6.1.3 Attack Types: Participants classified positive, unsafe URLs
(C5) correctly 55% of the time and they classified negative, unsafe
URLs (C6) correctly 74% of the time. This suggests people are more
inclined to trust URLs that use positive words or phrases, even if
they have no familiarity with the domain name. Table 4 shows that
participants, on average, correctly classified the URLs 77% of the
time, given that they had heard of the associated services.
Results suggest users visually process the user component of
URLs with the user@host attack type (C8) similar to how they
process the authority of URLs without a user component. In
general, the fixation count per character was low for the rest
component relative to both the scheme and authority components.
For C8, we observed a reduced fixation count per character and
time spent per character on the host component, which suggests
participants perceived the host component as part of the rest
component. Visual evidence suggests participants misidentified
the user component as the host for URLs in C8. Of the unsafe
URL categories, participants scored worst on C8. Participants spent
significantly more time per character on the user component than
the host component for C8, in support of H5.
We expect classification accuracies observed in this study are
upper bounds on what users achieve in practice without additional
safeguards in place. Sophisticated attacks that use URL features
participants do not know about will likely be more effective. We
also expect that attacks that use obfuscation in the rest component
- or what users perceive as the rest component - are more likely
to succeed given that participants spent less time on the rest
component than the authority component in our study.
6.2 Improving Security in Practice
The study suggests a sort of ceiling effect: as URL length increases,
participants spent more time vetting the URL until it capped out
at around 100 characters. It also provides visual evidence of user
misperceptions regarding URL structure. These insights into how
users process and perceive URLs suggest concrete steps and best
practices for services to improve the perceived security - and, we
argue, the actual security - associated with the URLs they serve. For
example, from a purely technical standpoint, there is no intrinsic
security benefit to serving a URL that is short, has a domain name
that begins with www, and has few special characters. But if those
URLs match users’ safety expectations, users would be better at clas-
sifying both safe URLs served by the service and unsafe, obfuscated
URLs served by adversaries.
Some unsafeURLs from our corpuswere classified as safe because
they exploited uncommon URL features that users rarely encounter
in practice with legitimate services. Ironically, this makes such URLs
easy for a computer to classify as risky. Surprisingly, we found that
some web browsers offer no user protection against such URLs,
even though simple-to-write parsers could easily detect them. This
provides an opportunity to improve security at minimal cost.
Last, our findings can improve the quality of security awareness
training programs. Our study identifies various misperceptions held
by users. It also provides concrete evidence of where users look
as they process URLs. This study’s methods and data may help in
assessing, comparing, and improving training modules that aim to
help users correctly identify URLs.
7 LIMITATIONS
Several considerations may have affected study generalizability:
Participants were predominantly male college students pursuing
electrical engineering degrees. To ensure the eye tracker accurately
picked up on AOIs, we used a large font and displayed URLs over
multiple lines. URLs were presented in isolation; contextual factors
(e.g., the device on which a URL is displayed, the application on
which a URL is viewed, or beliefs regarding who sent it) may affect
visual behaviors and responses. Also, repeatedly asking participants
whether URLs were safe likely sensitized them to phishing attacks.
However, we took precautions to minimize unintended effects.
We conducted pilot runs to ensure the interface was clear and user
fatigue was minimized. We used the post-experiment questionnaire
to evaluate experimental validity. And we used a neutral-mood-
inducing video to reduce variability in mood.
The available indicators provide some evidence of the study’s
validity. The average participant score of 63% is within the ballpark
of similar studies, e.g., [Dhamija et al. 2006; Sheng et al. 2010].
Post-task survey responses indicate most participants took the task
seriously, exercised equal or only slightly more caution than they
would in practice, andwere not fatigued. Thoughwe did not observe
significant bias, we believe any bias would be in the direction of
more caution and would be unlikely to invalidate our security
recommendations as problems during the classification task would
also be at play in the real world. We also note that applications and
interfaces in the wild may vary regarding font properties so there
is no one-size-fits-all approach for conducting such studies.
Last, the URLs may have had features we could not identify that
affected participants’ visual behaviors and responses. We attempted
to mitigate these concerns by including eight URLs per category,
but further work is needed. Also, we only considered a few flavors
of URL-based attacks. Notably, no attacks made use of the rest
component, which may have affected participants’ visual behaviors.
8 CONCLUSION AND FUTUREWORK
Eye tracking provides a window to examine security behavior. This
paper is a first step toward developing a model that captures how
users visually process, derive meaning from, and operationalize
URL security information to gauge URL safety. We conducted a
user study in which participants saw URLs and then classified them
while wearing an eye tracker. The findings suggest that participants
relied on poor security indicators such as presence ofwww to gauge
URL legitimacy, that they spent more time and cognitive resources
to vet longer URLs but only up to a point, and that, for the unsafe,
user@host URLs, participants perceived the user component to be
the host component. In future work, we plan to study other con-
textual factors such as mood, additional flavors of URL obfuscation,
and the effectiveness of training the user.
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